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DOJ Policy Updates
July 9, 2025

1. DOJ Overhauls Corporate Enforcement Tools

On May 12, 2025, Matthew R. Galeotti, Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Criminal Division, announced updated priorities and policies for prosecuting corporate and white collar crime. The priorities, which align with the Trump administration’s executive priorities, include, but are not limited to, (i) fraud, waste, and abuse; (ii) bribery and associated money laundering; and (iii) conduct that threatens U.S. national security. The policy updates include revisions to the Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP), a revised—and narrowed approach—to the appointment of corporate monitors, and an expansion of the subject areas included in the DOJ’s whistleblower program.

First, the revised CEP attempts to upgrade the incentives and predictability of voluntary self-disclosures by explicitly declaring a company “will” receive a declination, not just the presumption of a declination, if the company: (i) meets all voluntary self-disclosure requirements, (ii) fully cooperates, (iii) exhibits timely and appropriate remediation, and (iv) lacks aggravating circumstances. “Aggravating circumstances” is more narrowly defined under the revised CEP, including “criminal adjudication or resolution within the last five years based on similar misconduct by the entity engaged in the current misconduct.” Under this more narrow definition, certain recidivists will be able to obtain declinations if the remaining factors are met. Even where recidivism is an aggravating circumstance, prosecutors retain discretion to recommend a declination. The updated CEP also introduces a “Near Miss” category imposing reduced consequences for companies that have aggravating circumstances or do not meet the DOJ’s definition of voluntary self-disclosure. This middle-ground option may appeal to companies involved in more egregious misconduct, especially in light of the harsher penalties for companies ineligible for other resolutions.

Second, the DOJ’s new corporate monitor selection policy outlines four key factors for determining whether a monitor is appropriate in a given case: (i) the risk of recurrence of criminal conduct affecting U.S. interests; (ii) the availability and effectiveness of other independent government oversight; (iii) the efficacy of the company’s compliance program; and (iv) the maturity of the company’s internal controls and its ability to test and improve them. Emphasizing that a monitor is deemed necessary only where “there was a demonstrated need for and benefit to be derived from the monitorship that outweighed the cost and burden of the monitorship,” DOJ policy now requires that it be a collaborative and budget-capped endeavor, subject to biannual tripartite meetings between the DOJ, the company, and the monitor. This policy is intended to ensure any monitorships remain proportionate to the misconduct and company profile. As we reported last quarter—prior to the issuance of the revised monitor selection policy, but in line with the sentiments later to be expressed in it—the DOJ reviewed and terminated two monitorships for Glencore. It has also been reported that the DOJ is reviewing existing monitorships, although, to date, no other monitorships have been terminated early and reports indicate that at least two monitorships—for Balfour Beatty Communities and TD Bank— will remain in place.

Third, several priority subject areas were added to the DOJ’s offer of potential whistleblower recovery under its three-year whistleblower pilot program. These include: (1) procurement and federal programs fraud; (2) trade, tariff, and customs fraud; and (3) conduct involving sanctions, material support of foreign terrorist organizations, or those that facilitate cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), including money laundering, narcotics, and Controlled Substances Act violations. The updated priorities reflect the Trump Administration’s enforcement agenda, emphasizing national security and prevention of transnational threats while scaling back broader financial oversight and regulatory intervention. Since this memo was issued in May, AAG Galeotti has announced that the DOJ has already seen “robust tips from whistleblowers” that “cover many of the areas of focus in the [May 12] memo,” including tips relating to drug trafficking and corruption, procurement fraud, and healthcare fraud.

2. FCPA Enforcement Resumes

On June 9, 2025, the DOJ announced the resumption of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement, ending the enforcement pause initiated by Executive Order 14209. The DOJ’s new Guidelines for Investigations and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Guidelines) declare a renewed, yet narrowed, approach to FCPA enforcement.

The Guidelines align closely with the Trump administration’s prior directives to target cartels and TCOs, promote U.S. entities’ competitiveness overseas, and advance national security, with an express focus on the defense, intelligence and critical infrastructure sectors. Under the Guidelines, DOJ prosecutors are directed to evaluate potential FCPA investigations and enforcement actions based on four non-exhaustive factors: (1) involvement of cartels or TCOs; (2) economic injury to identifiable U.S. companies or individuals, particularly in cases where foreign actors gained an unfair advantage or where demand-side bribery harmed American interests; (3) threats to U.S. national security, with express focus on enforcement in the defense, intelligence, and critical infrastructure sectors; and (4) the seriousness of the misconduct, focusing on substantial bribes, sophisticated concealment efforts, fraudulent conduct in furtherance of the bribery scheme, and obstruction of justice. The Guidelines also establish a more rigorous vetting and approval process for new FCPA investigations and enforcement actions—requiring that all new FCPA matters be approved by either the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division (or the official acting in that capacity) or a more senior DOJ official.

While the Guidelines may give the impression that enforcement will look different, the continued focus on foreign companies with U.S. ties and the emphasis on historically high-risk industries reflect a clear through-line that remains faithful to the FCPA’s enforcement history. To wit, nine out of the ten largest FCPA settlements to date have been against foreign companies listed in the U.S. Additionally, while the requirement of approval from senior officials may slow the opening of certain investigations and associated preliminary steps, it is unlikely to delay or deter high-priority cases, which may move even more quickly under renewed prosecutorial focus.

What remains unclear is whether the DOJ will have the resources to pursue these priorities, whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will align their FCPA enforcement priorities with those of the DOJ, whether foreign governments will respond by targeting U.S.-based companies, and whether the revised Guidelines will materially change the types of cases that ultimately move forward.

Moving forward, companies and compliance teams should use the Guidelines as a prompt to remind employees of what is prohibited by the FCPA and to highlight that the DOJ has made clear that it plans to continue largely familiar enforcement practices. This is especially true in high-risk regions where employees may have misinterpreted the FCPA pause as a signal to relax standards. Moreover, it is in every company’s best interest to prioritize documenting and demonstrating that its compliance program is operating effectively, and that its compliance training is not only happening but is also effective. In the event of DOJ scrutiny of misconduct, a company’s ability to demonstrate a functioning and well-communicated compliance program can make a meaningful difference in reaching a favorable resolution. Proactively training employees and refocusing on the basics of FCPA compliance is best practice.

In sum, federal whistleblower incentives remain fully intact, FCPA enforcement has resumed, and the DOJ’s revised focus suggests a more selective but no less aggressive enforcement posture.

3. DOJ Announces Shift in Digital Assets Enforcement Priorities

In April, the DOJ announced that it “will no longer pursue litigation or enforcement actions that have the effect of superimposing regulatory frameworks on digital assets.” This marks a significant shift from the previous administration’s enforcement strategy and specifically orders that all ongoing DOJ investigations inconsistent with the announcement be closed.

The DOJ’s announcement aligns with the policies set forth in the White House’s crypto executive order by ending prosecution of “virtual currency exchanges, mixing and tumbling services, and offline wallets for the acts of their end users or unwitting violations of regulations.” Enforcement will now focus primarily on bad actors and acts that victimize cryptocurrency investors, such as embezzlement, misappropriation of customer funds, scams, hacks, and rug pulls. The DOJ will also prioritize cases where digital assets are used by cartels, foreign terrorist organizations, and specially designated global terrorists to engage in unlawful conduct, consistent with administration priorities. The DOJ further seeks to protect investors by directing the Office of Legislative Affairs and the Office of Legal Policy to propose victim-protective legislation and regulations that would improve asset-forfeiture efforts in the digital assets space.

The DOJ’s shift in enforcement strategy reflects the President’s directive to end “regulation by prosecution” and limit criminal enforcement to clear cases of investor harm, rather than using the DOJ to shape digital asset policy. Consistent with this directive, the memo ordered the Market Integrity and Major Frauds Unit to cease cryptocurrency enforcement and disbanded the National Cryptocurrency Team, but permitted the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section to continue to serve as liaisons between the DOJ and the digital asset industry. By removing the DOJ’s crypto policy arm, the administration aims to encourage the responsible regulation of blockchain technologies without the chilling effect of overlapping or punitive enforcement. The changes announced by the DOJ underscore the administration’s unified regulatory commitment to reshaping the existing digital asset market into one that is more transparent and investor-focused. 

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